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Abstract—Behavioral software models play a key role in many
software engineering tasks; unfortunately, these models either are
not available during software development or, if available, they
quickly become outdated as the implementations evolve. Model
inference techniques have been proposed as a viable solution to
extract finite state models from execution logs. However, existing
techniques do not scale well when processing very large logs, such
as system-level logs obtained by combining component-level logs.
Furthermore, in the case of component-based systems, existing
techniques assume to know the definitions of communication
channels between components. However, this information is
usually not available in the case of systems integrating 3rd-party
components with limited documentation.
In this paper, we address the scalability problem of inferring
the model of a component-based system from the individ-
ual component-level logs, when the only available information
about the system are high-level architecture dependencies among
components and a (possibly incomplete) list of log message
templates denoting communication events between components.
Our model inference technique, called SCALER, follows a divide
and conquer approach. The idea is to first infer a model of
each system component from the corresponding logs; then, the
individual component models are merged together taking into
account the dependencies among components, as reflected in the
logs. We evaluated SCALER in terms of scalability and accuracy,
using a dataset of logs from an industrial system; the results show
that SCALER can process much larger logs than a state-of-the-
art tool, while yielding more accurate models.
Index Terms—Model inference, Finite state machines, Logs,
Components
I. INTRODUCTION
Behavior models of software system components play a
key role in many software engineering tasks, such as program
comprehension [1], test case generation [2], and model check-
ing [3]. Unfortunately, such models either are scarce during
software development or, if available, they quickly become
outdated as the implementations evolve, because of the time
and cost involved in generating and maintaining them [4].
One possible way to overcome the lack of software models
is to use model inference techniques, which extract models—
typically in the form of (some type of) Finite State Machine
(FSM)—from execution logs. Although the problem of infer-
ring a minimal FSM is NP-complete [5], there have been sev-
eral proposals of polynomial-time approximation algorithms
to infer FSMs [5]–[7] or richer variants, such as gFSM
(guarded FSM) [8], [9] and gFSM extended with transition
probabilities [10], to obtain more faithful models.
Although the aforementioned model inference techniques
are fast and accurate enough for relatively small programs,
all of them suffer from scalability issues, due to the intrinsic
computational complexity of the problem. This leads to out-
of-memory errors or extremely long, unpractical execution
time when processing very large logs [11], such as system-
level logs obtained by combining (e.g., through linearization)
component-level logs. A recent proposal [7] addresses the scal-
ability issue using a distributed FSM inference approach based
on MapReduce. However, this approach requires to encode the
data to be exchanged between mappers and reducers in the
form of key-value pairs. Such encoding is application-specific;
hence, it cannot be used in contexts—like the one in which this
work has been performed—in which the system is treated as
a black-box, with limited information about the data recorded
in the individual components logs.
Another limitation of state-of-the-art techniques is that they
cannot infer, from component-level logs, a system-level model
that captures both the individual behaviors of the system’s
components and the interactions among them. Such a scenario
can be handled with existing model inference techniques for
distributed systems, such as CSight [12], which typically
assume the availability of channels definitions, i.e., which
events are used to communicate between which components.
However, this information is not available in many practical
contexts, where the system is composed of heterogenous, 3rd-
party components, with limited documentation about the mes-
sages exchanged between components and the events recorded
in logs.
In this paper, we address the scalability problem of inferring
the model of a component-based system from the individual
component-level logs (possibly coming from multiple execu-
tions), when the only available information about the system
are high-level architecture dependencies among components
and a (possibly incomplete) list of log message templates
denoting communication events between components. Our
goal is to infer a system-level model that captures not only
the components’ behaviors reflected in the logs but also the
interactions among them.
Our approach, called SCALER, follows a divide and conquer
strategy: we first infer a model of each component from the
corresponding logs using a state-of-the-art model inference
technique, and then we “stitch” (i.e., we do a peculiar type
of merge) the individual component models into a system-
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level model by taking into account the dependencies among
the components, as reflected in the logs. The rationale behind
this idea is that, though existing model inference techniques
cannot deal with the size of all combined component logs, they
can still be used to infer the models of individual components,
since their logs are sufficiently small. In other words, SCALER
tames the scalability issues of existing techniques by applying
them on the smaller scope defined by component-level logs.
We implemented SCALER in a prototype tool, which uses
MINT [8], a state-of-the-art technique for inferring gFSM,
to infer the individual component-level models. We evaluate
the scalability (in terms of execution time) and the accuracy
(in terms of recall and specificity) of SCALER in comparison
with MINT (fed with system-level logs reconstructed from
component-level logs), on seven proprietary datasets from
one of our industrial partners in the satellite domain. The
results show that our approach SCALER is about 245 times
(on average) faster and can process larger logs than MINT. It
generates nearly correct (with specificity always higher than
0.96) and largely complete models (with an average recall of
0.79), achieving higher recall than MINT (with a difference
ranging between +25 pp and +56 pp, with pp=percentage
points) while retaining similar specificity.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
• the SCALER approach for taming the scalability problem
of inferring the model of a component-based system from
the individual component-level logs, especially when only
limited information about the system is available;
• the empirical evaluation, in terms of scalability and
accuracy, of SCALER and its comparison with a state-
of-the-art approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives the basic definitions of logs and models that will be
used throughout the paper. Section III illustrates the motivating
example. Section IV describes the different steps of the core
algorithm of SCALER. Section V reports on the evaluation
of SCALER. Section VI discusses related work. Section VII
concludes the paper and provides directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the basic definitions for the main
concepts that will be used throughout the paper.
Logs: A log is a sequence of log entries; a log entry
contains a timestamp (recording the time at which the logged
event occurred) and a log message (with run-time information
related to the logged event). A log message is a block of free-
form text that can be further decomposed [13] into a fixed
part called event template, characterizing the event type, and
a variable part, which contains tokens filled at run time with
the values of the event parameters. For example, given the
log entry 20181119:14:26:00 send OK to comp1 ,
the timestamp is 20181119:14:26:00, the event template
contains the fixed words send and to, while the tokens OK
and comp1 are the values of the event parameters. More for-
mally, let ET be the set of all events that can occur in a system
and V be the set of all mappings from events parameters to
TC
MUXCHK GW
Fig. 1. The components of the example system and their dependencies
their concrete values, for all events et ∈ ET; a log L is a
sequence of log entries 〈e1, . . . , en〉, with ei = (tsi, eti, vi),
tsi ∈ N, eti ∈ ET , and vi ∈ V , for i = 1, . . . , n. We denote
the log of a component cX with LcX . To denote individual
log entries, we use the notation eki, j for the i-th log entry of
component k in the j-th execution; we drop the subscript j
when it is clear from the context.
Guarded Finite State Machines: We represent the models
inferred for a system as guarded Finite State Machines (gF-
SMs). A gFSM is a tuple m = (S,ET,G, δ, s0, F), where S is a
finite set of states, ET is the set of system events defined above,
G is a finite set of guard functions of the form g : V → {0, 1},
δ is the transition relation δ ⊆ S × ET × G × S, s0 ∈ S is the
initial state, F ⊆ S is the set of final states. Informally, a gFSM
is a finite state machine whose transitions are triggered by
the occurrence of an event and are guarded by a function that
evaluates the values of the event parameters. More specifically,
a gFSM m makes a guarded transition from a state s ∈ S to
a state s′ ∈ S when reading an input log entry e = (ts, et, v),
written as s
e−→ s′, if (s, et, g, s′) ∈ δ and g(v) = 1. We say that
m accepts a log l = 〈e1, . . . , en〉 if there exists a sequence of
states 〈γ0, . . . , γn〉 such that (1) γi ∈ S for i = 0, . . . , n, (2)
γ0 = s0, (3) γi−1
ei−→ γi for i = 1, . . . , n, and (4) γn ∈ F.
III. MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we discuss the motivations for this work
using an example based on a real system from one of our
industrial partners in the satellite domain. We consider a sim-
plified version of a satellite ground control system, composed
of the four components shown in Figure 1: TC, the module
handling tele-commands for the satellite, which is also the
entry point of the system; MUX, a multiplexer combining
different tele-commands into a single communication stream;
CHK, the module validating the tele-commands parameters
before they are sent to the satellite; GW, the gateway managing
the connections between the satellite and the ground control
system. Figure 1 also shows the architectural dependencies
among components; for example, the arrow from component
TC to component MUX indicates that TC uses (or invokes) an
operation provided by MUX. Every execution of the system
generates a set of logs, with one log for each component;
Figure 2 depicts the logs of the four system components
generated in two executions; for space reasons, the format of
timestamps has been compressed.
To infer a model from these individual component logs, one
could use existing model inference techniques for distributed
systems, such as CSight [12]. These techniques typically
assume the availability of channels definitions, i.e., which
events are used to communicate between which components.
However, this information is not available in many practical
contexts, including ours, where the system is composed of
CMP Execution 1 Execution 2
TC
eTC1,1= 14:26:01 sending X via f0 e
TC
1,2= 14:30:11 sending Y via f1
eTC2,1= 14:26:02 TC accepted e
TC
2,2= 14:30:12 wait message
MUX
eMUX1,1 = 14:26:01 initialize e
MUX
1,2 = 14:30:11 initialize
eMUX2,1 = 14:26:01 commandName = X e
MUX
2,2 = 14:30:12 commandName = Y
eMUX3,1 = 14:26:01 commandName = X e
MUX
3,2 = 14:30:12 data flow ID = f1
eMUX4,1 = 14:26:01 data flow ID = f0 e
MUX
4,2 = 14:30:12 send = no
eMUX5,1 = 14:26:02 send= ok
GW eGW1,1 = 14:26:01 encrypt TC_01 e
GW
1,2 = 14:30:12 reject command
CHK
eCHK1,1 = 14:26:01 mode 1 e
CHK
1,2 = 14:30:11 mode 0
eCHK2,1 = 14:26:02 automatic config
Log Message Templates
∗tmp1= sending v1 via v2 ∗tmp2= TC accepted ∗tmp3= wait message
∗tmp4= initialize tmp5= cmdName = v1 tmp6= data flow ID = v1
∗tmp7= send = v1 ∗tmp8= encrypt v1 ∗tmp9= reject command
∗tmp10= mode v1 ∗tmp11= automatic config
Fig. 2. (top) Component logs generated by two executions of the example
system; (bottom) Log message templates extracted from components logs
(communication events are marked with an asterisk).
heterogenous, 3rd-party components, with limited documenta-
tion. More specifically, the only available information about
the system are high-level architecture dependencies among
components (like those in Figure 1) and a (possibly incom-
plete) list of log message templates denoting communication
events between components. Since the latter do not represent
channels definitions we cannot use existing techniques for
model inference for distributed systems.
Another approach towards model inference would be to
reconstruct a system-level log from the individual component
logs and use non-distributed model inference techniques such
as MINT [8] or GK-tail+ [9]. However, such approaches
typically suffer from scalability issues due to the underlying
algorithms they use. For example, the main algorithm used
in MINT has worst-case time complexity that is cubic in
the size of the inferred model [14]; the algorithm used for
removing non-determinism from models can exhibit, based on
our preliminary evaluation, deep recursion that causes stack
overflows and makes MINT crash. Furthermore, GK-tail+ is
not publicly available and the largest log on which it was
evaluated contained 11386 log entries. Since the system of
our industrial partner can generate, when considering all the
components, logs with more than 30000 entries, there is need
for a scalable model inference technique that can process
component logs.
IV. SCALABLE MODEL INFERENCE
Our technique for system model inference from component
logs follows a divide and conquer approach. The idea is
to first infer a model of each system component from the
corresponding logs; then, the individual component models are
merged together taking into account the dependencies among
components, as reflected in the logs. We call this process
SCALER. The rationale behind our technique is that though
existing (log-based) model inference techniques cannot deal
with the size of all combined component logs, they can still be
used to infer the models of individual components, since their
logs are sufficiently small for the existing model inference
techniques to work. The challenge is then how to “stitch”
Preprocessing
Individual
components logs
Architectural
dependencies
Communication
events templates
MINT
Log entries
dependencies
extraction
Stitching
Stitch()
Graft()
Slice()
Insert()
Components
gFSMs
Log entries
dependencies
System
gFSM
Fig. 3. Workflow of the SCALER technique
together the models of the individual components to build a
system model that reflects not only the components behavior
but also their dependencies.
Figure 3 outlines the workflow of SCALER. The tech-
nique takes as input the logs of the different components,
possibly coming from multiple executions, a description of
the architectural dependencies among components, and a list
of log message templates denoting communication events
between components; it returns a system level gFSM. The
main two stages of the SCALER technique are pre-processing
and stitching. The pre-processing stage includes two steps:
- step 1 infers, for each component, its gFSM based on the
corresponding logs;
- step 2 derives, using the architectural dependencies and the
message templates of communicating events, the log
entries dependencies of each execution.
The intermediate outputs of the pre-processing step are then
used in the stitching stage, which is at the core of our
technique: in this stage, we “stitch” together the different
component-level gFSMs, taking into account the log entries
dependencies, to build a system-level gFSM. We describe these
two stages in the following subsections.
A. Pre-processing Stage
Inferring Component Models: We infer component-level
models using MINT [8], a state-of-the-art tool that is publicly
available.
MINT takes as input (1) the logs produced by the individual
component for which one wants to infer the model and (2) the
templates of the events recorded in the component logs. The
event templates are required to parse the log entries, to retrieve
the actual events and their parameters. Nevertheless, often such
templates are not available or documented. This situation is
typical when dealing with 3rd-party, black-box components—
as it is the case for the ground control system used by our
industrial partner—and it is known in the literature as the log
message format identification problem. We use MoLFI [13],
a state-of-the-art solution for this problem, to derive the event
templates that are then used by MINT; as an example, the box
at the bottom of Figure 2 shows the templates produced by
MoLFI from the logs of our running example.
The models inferred by MINT are gFSMs; Figure 4 shows
the component-level gFSMs inferred by MINT for the four
components of our running example. We use a compact
notation for the guards on the event parameters labeling the
mTC
s0
s1 s2
s3 s4
tmp1
(X, f0)
tmp1
(Y, f1)
tmp2 tmp3
mMUX
s5
s6
s7 s8
tmp4
tmp6
tmp5
tmp7
mGW
s9
s10s11
tmp8tmp9
mCHK
s12
s13
s14 s15
tmp10
(1)
tmp10
(0)
tmp11
Fig. 4. Component-level gFSMs inferred by MINT from the logs shown in
Table 2
guarded transitions; for example, in the gFSM of TC (i.e.,
mTC), the guard (X,f0) stands for (v1 = “X”, v2 = “f0”).
Identifying Log Entries Dependencies: A system-level
model of a component-based system has to capture not only
the behavior of the individual components but also the intrinsic
behavioral dependencies among them. For example, consider-
ing the fact that TC invokes MUX as shown in Figure 1, one
could speculate that the event recorded in entry eTC1,1 could lead
to the event recorded in entry eMUX1,1 in Figure 2; if this is the
case, the model should reflect this dependency.
Component dependencies can be extracted from the source
code by means of program analysis or from existing mod-
els such as UML Sequence Diagrams [15], [16]. However,
such techniques require either access to the source code or
the existence of complete documentation with fine-grained
information. None of these conditions can be fulfilled in the
common situation where systems integrate many 3rd-party
components, either because the source code is not available
or because software documentation is limited. This is the case
for the example system provided by our industrial partner:
the source code of 3rd-party components is not available,
the architectural documentation only includes coarse-grained
dependencies (like those shown in Figure 1), and the only
additional information is the knowledge of domain experts,
who can provide an incomplete list of log message templates
corresponding to events related to the “interactions” between
components (e.g., “send” and “receive” events). We remark
that this list of message templates, which we call communi-
cation events and are recorded in communication log entries,
cannot be used to define communication channels since we
do not know how these events are used for communication
between components. For all these reasons, we need to extract
additional information, in the form of more fine-grained de-
pendencies that reflect the logged events and their timestamps;
we call such dependencies log entries dependencies.
The idea at the basis of our log entries dependencies ex-
traction process is that, if there is an architectural dependency
from component cX to another component cY (representing the
use of cY by cX ), then there is at least (an event recorded in) a
log entry of cY that is the consequence of (an event recorded
in) a log entry of cX . This is because we can partition the log
entries of cY in two disjoint classes: (1) externally generated
(“ext-gen”), containing log entries that are produced as the
consequence of a communication (event recorded in a) log
entry of cX ; (2) internally generated (“int-gen”), all the other
log entries, i.e., those immediately following either an “ext-
gen” log entry or another “int-gen” entry. This means that to
extract the dependencies of all log entries between cX and cY ,
we first have to identify the “ext-gen” log entries of cY .
The identification of the “ext-gen” log entries of cY is
based on an intuitive observation: a communication log entry
ey of a component cY is produced as the consequence of a
communication log entry ex of a component cX only if there
is an architectural dependency between cX and cY , and the
timestamp of ex is less than or equal1 to the timestamp of ey .
However, by using only this observation, we cannot determine
the correct pair (ex, ey) of communication log entries if there
are multiple candidate pairs that satisfy the same constraint
on the timestamp. To illustrate this case, let us consider
communication log entries 〈eX1 , eX2 〉 of cX and 〈eY1 , eY2 〉 of cY ,
where the timestamp of eX1 is t1, the timestamps of both e
X
2 and
eY1 are t2, and the timestamp of e
Y
2 is t3, with t1 < t2 < t3. There
are three candidate pairs of communication log entries that
satisfy the constraint on the timestamp: (eX1 , eY1 ), (eX2 , eY1 ), and(eX2 , eY2 ). In such a case, we use an heuristic and select the pair
with the smallest timestamp difference; in the current example,
we would select (eX2 , eY1 ) and say that eX2 leads-to (inter-
component) eY1 , denoted with e
X
2  E e
Y
1 , to represent the
inter-component communication dependency. In our running
example, given the list of templates corresponding to (log
entries of) communication events: tmp1, tmp2, tmp4, and tmp7,
if we consider the architectural dependency from TC to MUX
and focus on the first execution, we say that eTC1  E e
MUX
1
and eTC2  E e
MUX
5 .
We remark that our heuristic may introduce some impreci-
sions with logs in which the timestamp granularity is relatively
coarse-grained (e.g., seconds instead of milli- or nano-seconds)
and the communication between components is fast enough
such that often two communication events that logically occur
one before the other are logged using the same timestamp; in
such cases, there would still be multiple candidate pairs2.
After identifying the “ext-gen” log entries of cY , every
“int-gen” log entry of cY can be related to the most recent
“ext-gen” log entry of cY . More precisely, if we have a
log 〈. . . , ei0, ei1, . . . , ein, . . . 〉 of cY where ei0 is an “ext-gen”
log entry followed by the sequence of “int-gen” log entries
〈ei1, . . . , ein 〉, we say that ei0 leads-to (intra-component) ei j ,
denoted with ei0  I ei j , for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In our running
example, when considering the logs of TC and MUX in the
first execution, given the “ext-gen” log entries eMUX1 and
eMUX5 identified as above, we say that e
MUX
1  I e
MUX
j for
j ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
By composing the leads-to (inter-component) and the leads-
to (intra-component) relations, we can finally extract the
log entries dependencies. More precisely, if we have a log
〈. . . , eX
k
, . . . 〉 of cX and a log 〈. . . , eYi0, eYi1, . . . , eYin, . . . 〉 of
cY , such that eXk  E e
Y
i0
and eYi0  I e
Y
i j
for j ∈
1We assume that the clocks of the different components are synchronized,
for example using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [17].
2Multiple candidate pairs could be addressed by exploring all potential log
entries dependencies for the construction of different models; we leave this
as part of future work.
TABLE I
EXTRACTED LOG ENTRIES DEPENDENCIES FOR THE RUNNING EXAMPLE
Execution Log entry dependencies
Exec1
eTC1  〈eMUX1 , eMUX2 , eMUX3 , eMUX4 〉
eTC1  〈eCHK1 〉 , eTC2  〈eMUX5 〉
eTC2  〈eCHK2 〉, eMUX4  〈eGW1 〉
Exec2
eTC1  〈eMUX1 , eMUX2 , eMUX3 〉
eTC1  〈eCHK1 〉 , eTC2  〈eMUX4 〉
eMUX4  〈eGW1 〉
Algorithm 1 STITCH
Input: Set of Components C = {cmain, c1, . . . , cn }
Set of gFSMs M = {mcmain,mc1, . . . ,mcn }
Set of Logs Lmain = {l1, . . . , lk }
Output: System model msys
1: Set of gFSMs W ← ∅
2: for each li ∈ Lmain do
3: gFSM mmain ← GRAFT(cmain, li, M)
4: W ← {mmain } ∪W
5: end for
6: gFSM msys ← DFAUnion(W )
7: return msys
{1, . . . , n}, we say that eX
k
leads-to 〈eYi0, eYi1, . . . , eYin 〉, denoted
with eX
k
 〈eYi0, eYi1, . . . , eYin 〉. When considering TC and
MUX in the first execution of our running example, we have
eTC1  〈eMUX1 , eMUX2 , eMUX3 , eMUX4 〉 because eTC1  E eMUX1 and
eMUX1  I e
MUX
j for j ∈ {2, 3, 4} as identified above; also,
we have eTC2  〈eMUX5 〉 because eTC2  E eMUX5 and eMUX5
does not lead-to (intra-component) anything. Table I shows
all the log entries dependencies extracted for the log entries
in Figure 2.
B. Stitching Stage
In this stage, we build a system-level gFSM that captures not
only the components’ behavior inferred from the logs but also
their dependencies as reflected in the log entries dependencies
identified in the pre-processing stage.
The construction of the system-level gFSM is based on a
simple but novel idea: we first build system-level gFSMs for
each execution and then merge these gFSMs together using
the standard DFA (Deterministic Finite Automaton) union
operation3. We call this process “stitching” and formalize it
through the pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.
We assume that, within a set of components C, there
is a component labeled cmain that corresponds to the root
component in the system architectural diagram (e.g., TC in our
running example). Algorithm STITCH takes as input C, a set
of component-level gFSMs M (one model for each component
in C), and a set of logs (one log for each execution) Lmain for
cmain; it returns a system-level gFSM msys. Internally, STITCH
3MINT produces a deterministic gFSM m = (S, ET,G, δ, s0, F), with δ :
S×ET ×G → S; it can be easily converted into a DFA m′ = (S, Σ, δ′, s0, F)
with δ′ : S × Σ→ S where Σ = ET ×G.
mcX
s0
s1
s2
eX1
eX2
mcY
s3
s4
s5 s6
eY1
eY2
eY3
Graft
mcXY
s0 s1
s4
s5s2s6
eX1
eY1
eY2
eX2e
Y
3
Log entries dependencies
eX1  〈eY1 , eY2 〉
eX2  〈eY3 〉
slice1
slice2
Fig. 5. The main intuition behind the GRAFT algorithm (for simplicity, we
use log entries as transition labels)
uses some auxiliary algorithms (GRAFT, SLICE, INSERT),
which are described further below.
The algorithm builds a system-level gFSM mmain for each
execution log li ∈ Lmain, starting from the component-level
gFSMs in M (lines 1–4); this is done by the GRAFT algorithm,
described in detail in § IV-B1. During the iteration through
the execution logs in Lmain, the resulting system-level gFSMs
mmain are collected in the set W . Last, the gFSMs in W are
merged into msys using the DFA union operation4 (line 6).
The algorithm ends by returning the system-level gFSM msys
(line 7), inferred from all executions in Lmain.
1) Graft: The GRAFT algorithm builds the system-level
gFSM for an execution by merging the individual component-
level gFSMs, taking into account the log entries dependencies
extracted from the execution. To illustrate the main idea
behind the algorithm, let us consider two components cX
and cY , whose corresponding gFSMs (inferred in the pre-
processing stage) mcX and mcY are shown in Figure 5.
These gFSMs respectively accept log lX = 〈eX1 , eX2 〉 and log
lY = 〈eY1 , eY2 , eY3 〉. Let us also assume that in terms of log
entries dependencies (expressed through the leads-to relation)
we have eX1  〈eY1 , eY2 〉 and eX2  〈eY3 〉. Taking into account
these dependencies, intuitively we can say that the gFSM
resulting from the merge of mcX and mcY , denoted by mcXY ,
should accept the sequence of log entries 〈eX1 , eY1 , eY2 , eX2 , eY3 〉.
To obtain mcXY , we first “slice” mcY into two gFSMs: slice1
(accepting 〈eY1 , eY2 〉) and slice2 (accepting 〈eY3 〉); then, we
“insert” 1) slice1 as the target of the transition of mcX that
reads eX1 , and 2) slice2 as the target of the transition of mcX
that reads eX2 .
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode of the GRAFT algorithm.
The algorithm takes as input a component ccur, an execution
log lcur = 〈e1, . . . , ez〉, and a set of component-level gFSMs
M = {mcmain,mc1, . . . ,mcn }; it returns a gFSM msl that accepts
the sequence of log entries composed of the entries ei ∈ lcur,
with each ei interleaved with the log entries to which it leads-
to.
The algorithm starts by slicing the gFSM mccur of the input
component ccur into a gFSM msl that accepts only lcur (line 2);
the actual slicing is done through algorithm SLICE, described
in detail in § IV-B2. The rest of the algorithm expands msl
4One could use the standard DFA minimization after the DFA union in
line 6 to reduce the size of the system-level gFSM. However, our preliminary
evaluation showed that the minimization operation can reduce the gFSM size
(in terms of numbers of states and transitions) by at most 5%, and it increases
the execution time of the STITCH algorithm by more than five times.
Algorithm 2 Graft
Input: Component ccur
Log lcur = 〈e1, . . . , ez 〉
Set of gFSMs M = {mcmain,mc1, . . . ,mcn }
Output: System model for the current execution msl
1: gFSM mcur ← getComponentGFSM(M, ccur)
2: gFSM msl ← SLICE(mccur, lcur)
3: State s ← getInitialState(msl )
4: for each ei ∈ lcur do
5: GuardedTransition gt← getGuardedTran(msl, s, ei )
6: Set of gFSMs W ← ∅
7: for each log entries sequence ld | ei  ld do
8: Component cd ← getComponentFromLog(ld )
9: gFSM mg ← GRAFT(cd, ld, M)
10: W ← {mg } ∪W
11: end for
12: gFSM mpl ← DFAParallelComposition(W )
13: msl ← INSERT(msl, gt,mpl )
14: s ← getTargetState(gt)
15: end for
16: return msl
taking into account the log entries dependencies (lines 3–14):
for each log entry ei ∈ lcur, a gFSM mg that accepts the log
entries sequence that ei leads-to is built and “inserted” in msl
as the target of the guarded transition gt that reads ei . More
precisely, the algorithm performs a run of msl as if it were to
accept the log lcur: starting from the initial state of msl (line 3),
it moves to the next state s by making the guarded transition gt
that reads ei (line 5). As part of this move, for each log entry
sequence ld such that ei  ld , we recursively call GRAFT to
build the gFSM mg that accepts ld; this gFSM is then added
to the set W (lines 7–10) . Since a log entry ei may lead-to
log entries sequences of multiple components, we compose
the individual gFSMs in W using the standard DFA parallel
composition operation (line 12). The resulting gFSM mpl is
“inserted” in msl as the target of gt by the INSERT algorithm
(line 13), described in detail in § IV-B3. At the end of each
iteration of the loop, the state s is updated with the target state
of the gt transition (line 14).
As an example, let us consider the case in which the
STITCH algorithm calls the GRAFT algorithm when processing
Execution-2 of our running example. Figure 6-(a) shows
the component-level gFSM and how they are related when
taking into account the leads-to relation listed in Table I.
Algorithm STITCH invokes GRAFT with parameters ccur = TC,
lcur = 〈eTC1,2, eTC2,2〉, M = {mTC,mMUX,mCHK,mGW }. The call to
SLICE yields the gFSM slice1 shown in Figure 6-(a); it accepts
〈eTC1,2, eTC2,2〉, using the transitions labeled with tmp1(Y, f 1) and
tmp3. Then, starting from s0 of slice1, the invocation of
the auxiliary function getGuardedTran yields the guarded
transition (s0, tmp1, [Y, f 1], s2) that reads eTC1,2. Since eTC1,2  
〈eMUX1,2 , eMUX2,2 , eMUX3,2 〉 and eTC1,2  eCHK1,2 , the algorithm makes
a recursive call for 〈eMUX1,2 , eMUX2,2 , eMUX3,2 〉, which returns the
sliced gFSM slice2, and for 〈eCHK1,2 〉, which returns slice3; both
gFSMs are shown in Figure 6-(a). At the end of the inner loop,
we have W = {slice2, slice3}; their parallel composition is m2,3
and is shown in Figure 6-(b). This gFSM is then inserted in
slice1 as the target of the transition (s0, tmp1, [Y, f 1], s2), as
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Fig. 6. Application of algorithm GRAFT to Execution-2 of the running
example
Algorithm 3 Slice
Input: A component gFSM mc
A component Log lc = 〈e1, . . . , ez 〉
Output: a sliced gFSM msl
1: gFSM msl ← initGFSM()
2: State s ← getSliceStartState(mc )
3: for each ei ∈ lc do
4: Guarded Transition gt← getGuardedTran(mc, s, ei )
5: msl ← AddGuardedTranAndStates(msl, gt)
6: s ← getTargetState(gt)
7: end for
8: updateSliceStartState(mc, s)
9: return msl
shown in Figure 6-(c). The algorithm ends for eTC1,2 by inserting
m2,3 in s2 and moves on to the next log entry eTC2,2.
2) Slice: This algorithm takes as input a component-level
gFSM mc and a log lc; it returns a new gFSM msl, which is
the sliced version of mc and accepts only lc .
Its pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 3. First, the algorithm
retrieves the state of mc that will become the initial state s
of the sliced gFSM msl (line 2). Upon the first invocation of
SLICE for a certain gFSM mc , s will be the initial state of mc;
for the subsequent invocations, s will be the last state visited
in mc when running the previous slice operations. Starting
from s, the algorithm performs a run of mc as if it were to
accept the log lc: the traversed states and guarded transitions
of mc are added into msl (lines 3–6). At the end of the loop,
the algorithm records (line 8) the last state visited in mc when
doing the slicing, which will be used as the initial state of the
next slice on mc; it then ends by returning msl.
3) Insert: We recall that this algorithm is invoked by the
GRAFT algorithm to “insert” a gFSM my into a gFSM mx as
the target of a guarded transition gt of mx , taking into account
the log entries dependencies. More specifically, let us consider
a log entry e and a set of logs L = {l1, . . . , ln} where e li
for i = 1, . . . , n; the transition gt of mx reads e, and my is
the parallel composition of the gFSMs that accepts the logs
in L. The INSERT algorithm merges my into mx such that, by
“inserting” my as the target of the guarded transition gt, mx
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Fig. 7. Example showing the basic idea of the INSERT algorithm, when
inserting my into mx as the target of the guarded transition gt with gt =
(sp, a, st ). Step 1 shows the application of duplication and redirection; step 2
applies determinization to merge states st and si .
can read the (entries in the) logs in L right after reading e.
We illustrate how the algorithm works through the example
in Figure 7, in which the input gFSMs mx and my are shown
on the left side; we will insert my into mx as the target of the
guarded transition gt, labeled with a and having st as target
state. Without loss of generality, we assume that my has only
one transition (labeled with α) between its initial state si and
the final one s f . The main idea behind the INSERT algorithm
is to duplicate both incoming and outgoing transitions of the
target state of gt, and to redirect the new copies to the initial
and finals states of my . More specifically:
• the incoming transition gt of st (labeled with a) is
duplicated and the new copy is redirected, by changing
its target state, to the initial state of my (i.e., si);
• the outgoing transitions of st (e.g., the one labeled with
b) are duplicated and the new copies are redirected, by
changing the source state, such that they originate from
the final state of mY (i.e., s f ).
The updated mx , resulting from the application of duplication
and redirection, is shown in the middle of Figure 7. We
remark that we keep the original incoming and outgoing
transitions of st on purpose, to take into account the cases
in which one of the log entries read by gt does not lead-to log
entries read by the transition labeled with α. Duplication and
redirection operations introduce some nondeterminism in mx ;
in our example, sp has two outgoing transitions both labeled
with a. We remove nondeterminism using a determinization
procedure [18], which recursively merges pair of states that
introduces nondeterminism5; in our example, the determiniza-
tion procedure will merge sx and si . The final mx is shown
on the right side of Figure 7.
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode of the INSERT algo-
rithm. The algorithm takes a gFSM mx , a guarded transition
gt, and a gFSM my; it returns the updated mx that includes
my as the target of gt. In the algorithm, st is the target state
of gt, si is the initial state of my and Fy is the set of the
final states of my . The core part (lines 4–10) iterates through
each guarded transition t of st , duplicates it, and redirects
5This procedure is different from the standard NFA (non-deterministic finite
automaton) to DFA conversion since it yields an automaton which may accept
a more general language than the NFA it starts from [18].
Algorithm 4 Insert
Input: gFSM mx
Guarded Transition gt
gFSM my
Output: Updated gFSM mx
1: State st ← getTargetState(gt)
2: State si ← getInitialState(my )
3: Set of States Fy ← getFinalStates(my )
4: for each Guarded Transition t of st do
5: if t = gt then
6: duplicateAndRedirectTransitions(t, st, {si })
7: else if t is an outgoing transition then
8: duplicateAndRedirectTransitions(t, sx, Fy )
9: end if
10: end for
11: determinization(mx )
12: return mx
the new copy as described above, using the the auxiliary
function duplicateAndRedirectTransitions. Last, the algorithm
removes nondeterminism using determinize (line 11); it ends
by returning the updated gFSM mx (line 12).
V. EVALUATION
We have implemented the SCALER approach as a Python
program. In this section, we report on the evaluation of the
performance of the SCALER implementation in generating
the model of a component-based system from the individual
component-level logs.
First, we assess the scalability of SCALER in inferring mod-
els from large execution logs. This is the primary dimension
we focus on since we propose SCALER as a viable alternative
to state-of-the-art techniques for processing large logs. Second,
we analyze how accurate the models generated by SCALER
are. This is an important aspect because it is orthogonal to
scalability and has direct implications on the possibility of
using the models generated by SCALER in other software
engineering tasks (e.g., test case generation). Summing up,
we investigate the following research questions:
RQ1: How scalable is SCALER when compared to state-of-
the-art model inference techniques?
RQ2: How accurate are the models (in the form of gFSMs)
generated by SCALER when compared to those gener-
ated by state-of-the-art model inference techniques?
A. Benchmark and Evaluation Settings
We used a benchmark composed of industrial, proprietary
datasets provided by one of our industrial partners, active in
the satellite industry. The benchmark contains component-level
logs recorded during the execution of a satellite ground control
system, which includes six major components. We created
the benchmark as follows. First, we executed system-level
tests on the ground control system 120 times and, in each
test execution, we collected the log files of the six major
components. Then, we created seven datasets of size ranging
from 5K to 35K, where the size is expressed in terms of the
total number of log entries. We assembled each dataset by
randomly selecting a number of executions out of the pool of
120 executions, such that the total size of the logs contained in
the dataset matched the desired dataset size. By construction,
each dataset contains logs of the six major components of
the system. The first three columns of Table II show, for
each dataset in our benchmark, the size and the number of
executions included in it. The experiments have been executed
on a high-performance computing platform, using one of its
quad-core nodes running CentOS 7 on a 2.40GHz Intel Xeon
E5-2680 v4 processor with 4GB memory.
B. Scalability
1) Methodology: To answer RQ1, we assess the scalability
of SCALER, in terms of execution time with respect to the
size of the logs, in comparison with MINT [8], a state-of-
the-art model inference tool. We selected MINT as baseline
because other tools are either not publicly available or require
information not available in most practical contexts, including
ours (e.g., channels’ definitions; see section III).
We ran both tools to infer a system-level model for each
dataset in our benchmark. We provided as input to SCALER
1) the logs of the six components recorded in the executions
contained in each dataset; 2) the architectural dependencies
among components; 3) the list of log message templates for
communication events, received from a domain expert. As
for MINT, we provided as input the system-level logs of the
system executions contained in each dataset. We derived these
system-level logs by linearizing the individual component logs
in each execution, taking into account the log entries depen-
dencies. To guarantee a fair comparison, these dependencies
are the same as those extracted in the pre-processing stage
of SCALER. Since the total number of possible system-level
logs is extremely large due to the linearization of the parallel
behaviors of the components, we only considered one system-
level log for each execution.
We remark that we used two instances of MINT: the one
used internally by SCALER to generate component-level mod-
els; the other one for the comparison in inferring system-level
models. For both instances, we used the default configuration
(i.e., state merging threshold k = 2 and J48 as data classifier
algorithm) [8]. Furthermore, to identify the event templates
required by the MINT instances to parse the log entries, we
first used a state-of-the-art tool (MoLFI [13]) to compute them
and then we asked a domain expert to further refine them, e.g.,
by collapsing similar templates into a single one. To take into
account the randomness of the log linearization (i.e., only one
linearized system-level log) for each execution of MINT, we
ran both MINT and SCALER ten times on each dataset.
To assess the statistical significance of the difference be-
tween the execution time of SCALER and MINT (if any), we
used the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test with a level
of significance α = 0.05. Furthermore, we used the Vargha-
Delaney (Aˆ12) statistic for determining the effect size of the
difference. In our case, Aˆ12 < 0.5 indicates that the execution
time of SCALER is lower than that of MINT.
2) Results: The columns under the header “Scalability” of
Table II show the scalability results for SCALER and MINT.
More precisely, column MINT indicates the execution time of
MINT; columns Prep, Stitch, and Total indicate the average
(over the ten runs) execution time (in seconds) and the corre-
sponding standard deviation of SCALER for the pre-processing
stage, the stitching stage, and the cumulative execution time,
respectively; column SpeedUp reports the speedup of SCALER
over MINT computed as TimeMINTTimeSCALER [19].
SCALER is faster than MINT for all the datasets in our
benchmark; the speed-up ranges between 27x (for the dataset
D05K) and 428x (for the dataset D25K). The speed-up in-
creases with the size of the datasets and, thus, the benefit
of using SCALER over MINT increases for larger logs. Note
that MINT reached the time out for the largest dataset (D35K)
without producing any model. The Wilcoxon test also confirms
that the differences in execution time between SCALER and
MINT are statistically significant (p-value < 0.01 for all
datasets) and the Vargha-Delaney statistic indicates that the
effect size is always large (Aˆ12 < 0.10) for all datasets.
Analyzing the performance of the two instances of MINT,
we can say that when MINT is used for component-level
model inference is much faster than MINT used for system-
level model inference because (1) the component logs are
smaller than the system-level logs and (2) there is a higher
similarity among component logs than system-level logs.
C. Accuracy
1) Methodology: To answer RQ2, we evaluated the accu-
racy of SCALER and MINT for each dataset, in terms of
recall and specificity of the inferred models following previous
studies [8]–[10]. Recall measures the ability of the inferred
models of a system to accept “positive” logs; specificity
measures the ability of the inferred models to reject “negative”
logs. We computed these metrics by using the well-known
k-folds cross validation method, which has also been used
in previous work [8]–[10] in the area of model inference.
This method randomly partitions a set of logs into k non-
overlapping folds: k − 1 folds are used as input of the model
inference tool, while the remaining fold is used as “test set”,
to check whether the model inferred by the tool accepts the
logs in the fold. The procedure is repeated k times until all
folds have been considered exactly once as the test set. For
each fold, if the inferred model successfully accepts a positive
log in the test set, the positive log is classified as True Positive
(TP); otherwise, the positive log is classified as False Negative
(FN). Similarly, if an inferred model successfully rejects a
negative log in the test set, the negative log is classified as
True Negative (TN); otherwise, the negative log is classified
as False Positive (FP). Based on the classification results, we
calculated the recall as Rec = |TP ||TP |+ |FN | , and the specificity as
Spec = |TN ||TN |+ |FP | .
As done in previous work [8]–[10], we synthesized neg-
ative logs from positive logs by introducing small changes
(mutations): 1) swapping two randomly selected log entries,
2) deleting a randomly selected log entry, and 3) adding a log
entry randomly selected from other executions. To make sure a
log resulting from a mutation contains invalid behaviors of the
system, we checked whether the sequence of entries around
TABLE II
EXECUTION TIME (IN SECONDS), RECALL, AND SPECIFICITY OF SCALER AND MINT
Dataset Size #Exec
Scalability Accuracy
MINT(s) SCALER
SpeedUp
Recall Specificity
Prep(s) Stitch(s) Total(s) MINT SCALER ∆Recall(pp) MINT SCALER ∆Specificity(pp)
D05K 5058 13 319.6 ±92.2 6.00 ±0.50 5.80 ±0.20 11.80 ±0.50 27.1 0.09 ±0.13 0.65 ±0.41 56 1 ±0.00 0.98 ±0.02 −2
D10K 10208 28 2597.0 ±733.4 10.90 ±0.90 15.30 ±0.50 26.20 ±1.20 99.2 0.16 ±0.26 0.63 ±0.23 47 0.99 ±0.02 0.98 ±0.01 −1
D15K 15078 42 7403.8 ±1805.1 13.40 ±1.50 19.80 ±0.80 33.20 ±2.00 222.8 0.52 ±0.24 0.82 ±0.22 30 0.99 ±0.01 0.97 ±0.02 −2
D20K 20094 56 16022.2 ±3313.5 18.60 ±1.30 32.10 ±1.40 50.70 ±1.90 315.9 0.58 ±0.14 0.86 ±0.18 28 0.98 ±0.01 0.97 ±0.01 −1
D25K 25034 71 35378.6 ±9380.9 24.30 ±1.90 58.20 ±2.70 82.50 ±4.10 428.7 0.56 ±0.22 0.83 ±0.27 27 0.98 ±0.02 0.96 ±0.02 −2
D30K 30103 86 59222.7 ±11780.1 29.00 ±1.30 129.60 ±4.50 158.60 ±4.70 373.3 0.61 ±0.14 0.86 ±0.14 25 0.98 ±0.02 0.96 ±0.01 −2
D35K 35079 101 timeout N/A 32.50 ±1.90 72.00 ±2.10 104.50 ±2.90 N/A N/A N/A 0.88 ±0.14 N/A N/A N/A 0.97 ±0.01 N/A
Average 20093.4 56.7 20157.3 ±4517.5 19.30 ±1.30 47.50 ±1.70 66.80 ±2.40 244.5 0.42 ±0.19 0.79 ±0.23 35.5 0.99 ±0.01 0.97 ±0.01 −1.67
the mutation location (i.e., the mutated entries and the entries
immediately before and after the mutants) did not also appear
in the positive logs.
Note that we needed to derive system-level logs from the
individual component logs in test sets to check the acceptance
of the system-level models inferred by SCALER and MINT. To
this end, as done for the scalability evaluation, for each exe-
cution in the test sets, we linearized the individual component
logs to derive the system-level log. Also, to take into account
the randomness of the derivation of system-level logs, we
repeat the 10-folds cross validation ten times on each dataset
and then applied statistical tests as done for the scalability
evaluation.
2) Results: The columns under the header “Accuracy” of
Table II show the results of MINT and SCALER in terms of
recall, specificity, and difference of these values (in percentage
points, pp) between SCALER and MINT. MINT achieves high
specificity scores, always greater than 0.98. However, recall
(i.e., the rate of positive logs accepted by the inferred models)
is low, ranging between 0.09 for the D05K dataset and 0.61 for
the D30K dataset. Notice that no results were obtained for the
larger dataset with 35K log entries (D35K) because MINT
reached the timeout of 24h without generating any model.
SCALER achieves a slightly lower specificity than MINT, with
an average difference of 1.67pp. However, SCALER achieves
substantially higher recall than MINT. The difference in recall
values ranges between +25pp (D30K dataset) and +56pp
(D05K dataset), with an average improvement of 35.5pp. For
the larger dataset with 40K log entries, SCALER generates
gFSMs that achieves a recall value of 0.88 and a specificity
value of 0.97 in less than two minutes. Instead, MINT could
not generate any gFSM within 24h of running time.
According to the Wilcoxon test, SCALER always achieves a
statistically higher recall than MINT for all datasets (p-value <
0.01) with a large effect size. However, SCALER achieves a
statistically lower specificity than MINT in five out of seven
datasets (i.e., with 5k, 10K, 20K and 30K log entries). While
the difference in specificity are statistically significant, it is
worth noting that the magnitude of the difference is small,
being no larger than 2pp.
D. Discussion and Threats to Validity
From the results above, we conclude that, for the large
logs typically encountered in practice, SCALER provides
results that are good enough to generate nearly correct (with
a specificity always greater than 0.96) and largely complete
models (with an average recall of 0.79), which can then
be refined by engineers. The incompleteness of the inferred
models is due to the limited knowledge we have on the system
(i.e., the incomplete list of message templates characterizing
communication events) and to the heuristic used in computing
log entries dependencies, which is affected by the coarse-
grained timestamp granularity of the logs included in our
benchmark. In contrast, MINT, when used as a stand-alone
tool on the same large logs, does not scale and fares poorly
in terms of recall, generating very incomplete models.
The gFSMs inferred by MINT and SCALER (as well as by
any other model inference technique) need to be reviewed and
amended (by adding/removing/changing states and transitions)
by engineers. The effort required to amend the inferred models
is proportional to the number of false negatives and false
positives. From a practical perspective, the results achieved by
SCALER lead to a considerable reduction of false negatives,
with a marginal increment of false positives. For example, for
the D15K dataset, MINT generates (in about two hours) a
gFSM that accepts only 52% of the true positives (positive
logs). In this case, engineers need to substantially modify the
inferred gFSM to accept the remaining 48% of positive logs.
Instead, for the same dataset, SCALER generates in about 33
seconds a gFSM that accepts 82% of the positive logs (and
rejects 97% of the negative logs). The marginal decrement of
the negative logs correctly dismissed by the gFSM inferred by
SCALER is largely compensated by (1) a significant reduction
of the number of wrongly rejected positive logs (+30pp in
recall), and (2) a substantial reduction of the execution time
(SCALER is about 222 times faster than MINT).
In terms of threats to validity, the size of the log files is a
confounding factor that could affect our results (i.e., accuracy
and execution time). We mitigated such a threat by considering
seven datasets with different sizes (ranging from 5K to 35K
log entries) and different sets of system executions.
VI. RELATED WORK
Starting from the seminal work of Biermann and Feld-
man [5] on the k-Tail algorithm, which is based on the concept
of state merging, several approaches have been proposed to
infer a Finite State Machine (FSM) from execution traces
or logs. Synoptic [6] uses temporal invariants, mined from
execution traces, to steer the FSM inference process to find
models that satisfy such invariants; the space of the possible
models is then explored using a combination of model refine-
ment and coarsening. InvariMINT [20] is an approach enabling
the declarative specification of model inference algorithms
in terms of the types of properties that will be enforced
in the inferred model; the empirical results show that the
declarative approach outperforms procedural implementations
of k-Tail and Synoptic. Nevertheless, this approach requires
prior knowledge of the properties that should hold on the
inferred model; such a pre-condition cannot be satisfied in
contexts (like the one in which this work is set) where
system components are black-boxes and the knowledge about
the system is limited. Other approaches infer other types of
behavioral models that are richer than an FSM. GK-tail+ [9]
infers guarded FSM (gFSM) by extending the k-Tail algorithm
and combining it with Daikon [21] to synthesize constraints on
parameter values; such constraints are represented as guards
of the transitions of the inferred model. MINT [8] also
infers a gFSM by combining EDSM (Evidence-Driven State
Merging) [22] and data classifier inference [23]. EDSM, based
on the Blue-Fringe algorithm [14], is a popular and accurate
model inference technique, which won the Abbadingo [14]
and the StaMinA competition [24]. Data-classifier inference
identifies patterns or rules between data values of an event
and its subsequent events. Using data classifiers, the data
rules and their subsequent events are explicitly tied together.
ReHMM (Reinforcement learning-based Hidden Markov Mod-
eling) [10] infers a gFSM extended with transition probabil-
ities, by using a hybrid technique that combines stochastic
modeling and reinforcement learning. ReHMM is built on
top of MINT; differently from the latter, it uses a specific
data classifier (Hidden Markov model) to deal with transition
probabilities. All the aforementioned approaches cannot avoid
scalability issues due to the intrinsic computational complexity
of inferring FSM-like models; the minimal consistent FSM in-
ference is NP complete [25] and all of the practical approaches
are approximation algorithm with polynomial complexity.
Model inference has also been proposed in the context of
distributed and concurrent systems. CSight [12] infers a com-
municating FSM from logs of vector-timestamped concurrent
executions, by mining temporal properties and refining the
inferred model in a way similar to Synoptic. MSGMiner [26] is
a framework for mining graph-based models (called Message
Sequence Graphs) of distributed systems; the nodes of this
graph correspond to Message Sequence Chart, whereas the
edges are determined using automata learning techniques. This
work has been further extended [27] to infer (symbolic) class
level specifications. However, these approaches require the
availability of channel definitions, i.e., which events are used
to send and receive messages among components.
Liu and Dongen [28] uses a divide and conquer strategy,
similar to the one in our SCALER approach, to infer a
system-level, hierarchical process model (in the form of a
Petri net with nested transitions) from the logs of interleaved
components, by leveraging the calling relation between the
methods of different components. This approach assumes
the knowledge of the caller and callee of each component
methods; in our case, we do not have this information and
rely on the leads-to relation among log entries, computed from
high-level architectural descriptions and information about the
communication events.
One way to tackle the intrinsic scalability issue of
(automata-based) model inference is to rely on distributed
computing models, such as MapReduce [29], by transforming
the sequential model inference algorithms into their corre-
sponding distributed version. In the case of the k-Tail al-
gorithm, the main idea [11] is to parallelize the algorithm
by dividing the traces into several groups, and then run an
instance of the sequential algorithm on each of them. A
more fine-grained version [7] parallelizes both the trace slicing
and the model synthesis steps. Being based on MapReduce,
both approaches require to encode the data to be exchanged
between mappers and reducers in the form of key-value
pairs. This encoding, especially in the trace slicing step, is
application-specific; hence, it cannot be used in contexts in
which the system is treated as a black-box, with limited infor-
mation about the data recorded in the log entries. Furthermore,
though the approach can infer a FSM from large logs of over
100 million events, the distributed model synthesis can be
significantly slower for k ≥ 2, since the underlying algorithm
is exponential in k.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the scalability problem of
inferring the model of a component-based system from the
individual component-level logs, assuming only limited (and
possibly incomplete) knowledge about the system. Our ap-
proach, called SCALER, first infers a model of each system
component from the corresponding logs; then, it merges the
individual component models together taking into account the
dependencies among components, as reflected in the logs. Our
evaluation, performed on logs from an industrial system, has
shown that SCALER can process larger logs, is faster, and
yields more accurate models than a state-of-the-art technique.
As part of future work, we plan to refine the heuristics used
for identifying the dependencies of the log entries between
multiple components, to take into account logs with impre-
cise timestamps and out-of-order messages. We also plan to
evaluate SCALER on different datasets and to integrate it with
other model inference techniques. Finally, we will assess the
effectiveness of the inferred models in software engineering
activities, such as test case generation.
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